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   Absztrakt 
   KIBERTERRORIZMUS ÉS A KRITIKUS INFORMÁCIÓS INFRASTRUKTÚRÁK VÉ-
DELME. HELYZETKÉP A SZABÁLYOZÁSI PROBLÉMÁK JELENLEGI HELY-
ZETÉRŐL. 
   A nyugati államok évtizedek óta harcolnak a terrorizmus ellen, azonban egyes alapvető 
szabályozási kérdések a mai napig megválaszolatlanul maradtak. Következésképpen a 
konvencionális terrorizmushoz hasonlóan a terrorizmus legújabb formája, a kiberterrorizmus 
kapcsán is számos jogi bizonytalanság tapasztalható. A (kiber-)terrorizmust szabályozó 
nemzetközi egyezmények bonyolult és hiányos rendszere a kérdéskör csak bizonyos 
vonatkozásairól rendelkezik, továbbá alapvetően az államok felelősségi körébe helyezi a (kiber-
)terrorizmus szabályozását anélkül, hogy egyes alapvető normák egységes rendszerét felállítaná. 
Jelen írásban a szerző a kiberterrorizmus nemzetközi és nemzeti jogi vonatkozásait tárgyalja 
kiemelve a kritikus információs infrastruktúrák védelmének különleges területét. Ugyancsak 
említésre kerül a kiberterrorizmus a nemzetközi humanitárius jog tükrében. 
   Kulcsszavak: kiberterrorizmus, kritikus információs infrasturktúrák, kiberbűnözés, 
kibertámadás, kibervédelem, terrorelhárítás 
   Diszciplinák: informatika, hadtudomány, jogtudomány 
 
   Abstract 
   Western states fight against terrorism for decades now, however, certain fundamental 
regulatory questions stay unanswered to this day. Consequently, with the newest form of 
terrorism, cyberterrorism, arise just as many legal uncertainties as with conventional terrorism. 





The complicated and incomplete system of international treaties on (cyber-)terrorism only cover 
certain aspects of the issue, moreover they generally make the individual states responsible for 
regulating (cyber-)terrorism without defining a common system of basic rules. In this paper the 
author discusses cyberterrorism from an international and national legal perspective highlighting 
the specific area of critical information infrastructure protection. Furthermore the paper also 
takes into consideration cyberterrorism in the light of international humanitarian law. 
   Keywords: cyberterrorism, critical information infrastructures, cybercrime, cyber-attack, 
cyber-defense, counter-terrorism 
   Disciplines: information technology, military sciences, law 
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   Although part of the literature still argues 
that cyberterrorism is not a real threat (Cohen-
Almagor, 2018), the author believes it not to 
be the case. To the contrary, the author 
considers it only a matter of time, until 
terrorist groups become regular perpetrators 
of cyber-attacks besides states and purely 
financially motivated cybercriminals. In cyber-
space, acts of malicious intent can be carried 
out with very little funds, but on a large scale 
and often without the fear of identification. 
The information systems of critical infra-
structures are facing one of the biggest 
cyberthreats coming from international 
terrorist organizations, therefore it is very 
important to ensure an effective and secure 
cyber defense system both on a technical and 
on a regulatory level.    
   It is clear that state authorities have a great 
interest in regulating cyber-related actions, 
however, numerous problems came to light in 
connection with the regulation of cyber-
terrorism both on the level of international 
law, as well as on the level of national law.  
   In this article, the author presents considera-
tions regarding the definition of (cyber-)ter-
rorism and critical information infra-
structures, as well as possible demarcations 
from other related areas of malicious cyber-
activities. The author then presents cyber-
terrorism in the system of international law 
stressing certain significant regulatory de-
ficiencies and pressing questions. Lastly, the 
author discusses the regulatory framework of 
cyberterrorism in Hungary. 
 
   Cyberterrorism  
   and critical information infrastructures 
   To discuss cyberterrorism, first, terrorism as 
well as international terrorism need to be 
defined. Unfortunately, to this day, there is no 
internationally accepted common definition 
on terrorism. There have been numerous 
attempts for finding the possible aspects of 





classification, however, no result became part 
of international law yet. Clearly, defining what 
terrorism is, or what does not actually fall 
under the scope of terrorist activity is one of 
the most fundamental questions, and the lack 
of a common term leads to significant 
regulatory difficulties. Moreover, as discussed 
later, it makes impossible to create an 
international agreement specifically for the 
fight against international terrorism in its 
modern form.  
   However, despite the lack of an exact 
definition, it is still possible to make a 
distinction between terrorism, international 
terrorism and cyberterrorism. Terrorism is of 
national character, no cross-border actions 
take place in this case, hence the aim of a 
terroristic attack is to achieve a change on a 
national political level. Terrorism was 
dominant from the 19th century up until the 
1960s, during the first two waves of terrorism 
(Martinez, 2016). Then the term international 
terrorism was created as a consequence of the 
new era of terrorism, also known as the third 
(revolutionary) wave of terrorism during the 
1970s and it has since evolved into the fourth 
(religious) wave of terrorism (Martinez, 2016). 
International terrorism is not concentrated in 
one singular state but is connected to multiple 
states.  
   Based on the international and borderless 
character of cyberspace, or more precisely, 
since the state from which the cyberattack is 
launched (especially with a terrorist motive) 
often differ from the targeted state, cyber-
terrorism must be categorized as a form of 
international terrorism. The main goals of 
cyberterrorism do not differ from the of the 
traditional international terrorism, only cyber-
terrorism is enabled by information com-
munication technologies and it takes place in 
cyberspace. Kovács and Illési defined for 
which purposes terrorist groups could pos-









 gaining data and information.  
 
  Two main group of actions of cyberterrorists 
can be identified (Shiryaev, 2013). On one 
hand, there are Internet based criminal actions 
that support the overall functioning of a 
terrorist group, such as fundraising, dis-
semination, secure communication and re-
cruiting new members through propaganda 
(Pataki & Kelemen, 2014). On the other hand, 
there is a possibility of actual cyberattacks 
coming from terrorist groups with the intent 
of disrupting or destroying the information 
systems of (critical) infrastructures, or to steal 
valuable data from them (Mikac, Mamic, & 
Zutic, 2020).  
   It can be argued that cyberterrorism is the 
future of international terrorism, because the 
attacks are easily scalable, less risky and dis-
proportionately cheap (Fidler, 2016), 
however, it needs to be stressed, that in the 
eye of the general public, cyberattacks happen 
behind-the-scenes, therefore it is hard to 
reach one of the main goals of terrorist groups 
by cyber means, namely, to cause fear. Never-
theless, the author of this paper argues, that 





by attacking the critical information infra-
structures of a state, this goal would be very 
well reached. For example, a disruption in 
service in the financial, energy, or telecom-
munication sector, or a combination of them, 
would rapidly lead to a general distress, and 
after a short while to panic and terror in any 
western state. On a different note, it has to be 
mentioned that, because of the invisible 
nature of cyber-attacks, in order to avoid 
public distress, the state that has been attacked 
would most probably deny terrorist in-
volvement, and would officially regard the 
disruption in service as a pure malfunction.  
   It must be noted also that in certain cases a 
cyberattack is only the first step in a line of 
actions and not the attack itself causes the 
destruction, but it is strictly necessary for 
achieving the goal. For example, a cyber-
attack against the information infrastructure 
of a nuclear reactor can lead to the dispersal 
of radioactive material. 
   Critical information infrastructures are 
critical infrastructures themselves or are 
integral part of other critical infrastructures 
and serve their functioning. Even though, 
they are not connected to the Internet for 
security reasons, their vulnerability still 
possibly imposes a major risk for every state’s 
national security. It is not without example, 
that an attacker manages to get into the 
information systems of critical infrastructures 
and causes malfunction or an outage in the 
performance (Tóth, 2016).  
   Critical information infrastructures are one 
of the most probable targets of cyber-
terrorists, as well as opposing states, because 
the short-term and long-term effects of a 
successful cyberattack on just one critical 
information infrastructure can be enormous. 
Additionally, it may possibly lead to the failure 
of service of multiple critical infrastructures 
deriving from the general rule of inter-
dependency among critical infrastructures. 
Wall argues that the main characteristic of 
cyberterrorism, which in fact makes it differ 
from hacktivism mainly is that cyberterrorist 
attacks are carried out against critical 




   Differentiating cyberterrorism 
   from other acts of malicious intent 
   in cyberspace 
   Firstly, in the context of defining cyber-
terrorism, the question always arises, where 
can the line be drawn between cyberterrorism 
and cybercrime, moreover, whether there is a 
strict line at all. The literature points out that 
the methods of cyberterrorism and cyber-
crime overlap to a great extent. From targeted 
and non-targeted cyberattacks to crimes that 
already existed, but are now enabled through 
today’s information technology, such as 
money laundering for example, all of them 
might be carried out by cybercriminals as well 
as cyberterrorists. The main difference lays in 
the motive of the perpetrator. Cybercriminals 
mostly act because of the financial benefit of 
cybercrimes, or in a few cases just for the sake 
of it, whereas for terrorist groups, there is 
always a political, ideological, or religious 
agenda behind their cyberactivity.  
   Dornfeld emphasizes, that it is unreasonable 
and disadvantageous to draw a hard line 
between cyberterrorism and cybercrime, and 
it can only be done theoretically anyways, 





because in most cases the attacker is un-
identifiable, the methods and tools are in both 
cases often the same, and the motives are in 
reality often unclear (Dornfeld, 2019). Since 
with a cyberterrorist attack it is hard to get 
across the political, ideological, or religious 
agenda, moreover the possibility to cause fear 
in the public is very narrow as discussed 
above, terrorist groups still tend to carry out 
their attacks outside of cyberspace (Haig & 
Kovács, 2007).  
   Terrorist activity in cyberspace seems to 
remain subsidiary to armed attacks and their 
primary aim is to assist the functioning of the 
terrorist group via cybercrimes. As an 
exception, spreading terroristic propaganda 
and broadcasting dangerous information 
(former aimed the general public with the goal 
to recruit new members, the latter at the 
members of a terrorist group, e.g. how to 
make a bomb) are unique to terrorist groups 
and both are committed on the Internet on a 
large scale. As an example, the cyber forces of 
al-Qaeda, named the digital jihad, are very 
active on the not overly ruled and blue-
penciled sites of social media, such as on 
Twitter (Kovács & Illési, 2011).  
   Secondly, cyberterrorism and cyber warfare 
need to be differentiated as well. According to 
Dornfeld, the main dissimilarity can be found 
in the fact, that cyber warfare is always 
connected at least to one state, whereas 
cyberterrorism has no element of state 
authority. But then again, even though this 
distinction exists on a theoretical level, in 
practice no state is willing to admit to a 
cyberattack carried out in peace time. Valerie 
and Knights also point out the close 
connection of cyberattacks against national 
critical infrastructures carried out by terrorist 
groups and opposing nations (Valerie & 
Knights, 2000). Naturally, the scale and 
intensity of a cyberattack by a state will 
presumably always be much higher, than as of 
a terrorist group, however the author would 
like to point out, that cyber warfare is closely 
connected to cyberattacks only. In other 
words, cybercrimes via the Internet, also 
known as soft cyberterrorism (Kovács & 
Illési, 2011), such as money laundering or drug 
trafficking, which make up most of the 
current cyber activities of terrorist groups, will 




   Cyberterrorism and International law 
   In the last few decades, numerous inter-
national and regional treaties came to life in 
connection with the fight against terrorism. 
According to Kecskés, these agreements can 
be divided into two groups (Kecskés, 2019). 
On one hand, there are those agreements that 
are universal in nature, meaning they were not 
created specifically for terrorist activities, 
however, they regulate actions typically com-
mitted by terrorist groups. These are the 
following:  
 1963 Convention on Offences and 
Certain Other Acts Committed on 
Board Aircraft.  
 1970 Convention for the Suppression 
of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft.  
 1971 Convention for the Suppression 
of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of 
Civil Aviation. 
 1988 Protocol for the Suppression of  





Unlawful Acts of Violence art Airports 
Serving International Civil Aviation.  
 1973 Convention on the Prevention 
and Punishment of Crimes Against 
Internationally Protected Persons. 
 1979 International Convention against 
the Taking of Hostages.  
 1979 Convention on Physical 
Protection of Nuclear Material.  
 1988 Convention for the Suppression 
of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of 
Martitime Navigation. 
 1988 Protocol for the Suppression of 
Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of 
Fixed Platforms Located on the 
Continental Shelf.  
 1991 Convention on the Marking of 
Plastic Explosives for the Purpose of 
Detection. 
 2010 Convention on the Suppression 
of Unlawful Acts Relating to 
International Civil Aviation. 
 2010 Protocol Supplementary to the 
Convention for the Suppression of 
Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft.  
 2013 Arms Trade Treaty. 
 
 
   On the other hand, there are three con-
ventions, specifically regulating terrorism, 
namely: 
 1997 International Convention for the 
Suppression of Terrorist Bombings 
 1999 International Convention for the 
Suppression of the Financing of 
Terrorism 
 2005 International Convention for the  
Suppression of Acts of Nuclear 
Terrorism 
 
   According to O’Donnell, who discusses the 
complicated system of international treaties 
on terrorism in great detail, the main and 
common goal of the treaties is to obligate the 
ratifying states to implement the crimes 
defined by the treaties into their respective 
domestic criminal laws and to punish these 
crimes with an appropriate sentence in light of 
the gravity of the crime committed (see: 
O'Donnell, 2006). Further aim of the treaties 
is to define jurisdiction for the crimes in the 
treaty in question. Jurisdiction in these 
multilateral agreements is based on ter-
ritoriality, on the nationality of the offender 
and the victim, and in some cases on the 
presence of the attacker in the territory of the 
state (O'Donnell, 2006).  
   The treaties define a large number of of-
fences, such as crimes against civil aviation, 
crimes against the person, and crimes com-
mitted in connection with a bomb or nuclear 
material (O'Donnell, 2006). There are two 
crimes in connection with the financing of 
terrorism as well. Unfortunately, however, 
with the exception of the Protocol Sup-
plemental to the Convention for the Sup-
pression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft and 
the Convention on the Suppression of 
Unlawful Acts Relating to International Civil 
Aviation, none of the multilateral treaties 
from above expressively mention cyberattacks 
(Fidler, 2016).  
   Shiryaev analyzed the different sources of 
terrorist threats in light of the main question, 
whether certain terrorist attacks impose a real 
threat in the realities of cyberspace (Shiryaev, 





2013). For reasons of space, only those 
aspects will be covered here, that are the 
subject of the three main conventions on 
terrorism. 
 
   Terrorist bombings 
   According to Article 2 (1) of the Inter-
national Convention for the Suppression of 
Terrorist Bombings ”any person commits an 
offense within the meaning of this Con-vention if that 
person unlawfully and intentionally delivers, places, 
discharges or detonates an explosive or other lethal 
device in, into or against a place of public use, a State 
or government facility, a public transportation system 
or an infrastructure facility: a. With the intent to cause 
death or serious bodily injury; or b. With the intent to 
cause extensive destruction of such a place, facility or 
system, where such destruction results in or is likely to 
result in major economic loss”. Shiryaev argues that 
one cannot commit such a crime through 
delivering or placing, since the physical 
interaction with the bomb is cyberspace is 
impossible, however, he acknowledges the 
realities of discharging or detonating a bomb 
through cyber means, in which case a 
cyberattack could have the capability to cause 
death, serious bodily injury or substantial 
material damage (Article 1(3) of the 
International Convention for the Suppression 
of Terrorist Bombings). As an example of 
such an attack, Shiryaev references Cohen and 
points to the possibility of an attack against 
computers at nuclear reactors and biological 
labs, which would evidently lead to a disaster 
sufficing the legal requirements from above. 
 
   Financing terrorism 
   The International Convention for the Sup-
pression of the Financing of Terrorism from 
1999 prohibits the provision or collection of 
funds in order to carry out terrorist acts. 
Shiryaev expresses the view, that the scope of 
this Convention is very limited in connection 
to cyberterrorism, since according to him, it 
would only be applicable in the unlikely event, 
that someone’s bank account is broken into 
through a cyber-attack with the intent of 
transferring money to terrorists, or acquiring 
it for further use. In the authors opinion, 
however, cyberterrorism is not limited to 
cyber-attacks, but it includes soft cyber-
terrorist acts described above as well. As a 
consequence, the Convention on Financing 
Terrorism would apply to cyberterrorism in 
cases of cybercrimes carried out via Internet 
for the purpose of collecting funds. 
 
   Acts of Nuclear terrorism 
   Shiryaev points out that based on the terms 
used in the Convention on the Physical 
Protection of Nuclear Material (e.g. pos-
session, use, transfer, theft, fraudulent 
obtaining, moving; Article 7 (1) (a)-(c) 
Convention on the Physical Protection of 
Nuclear Material) of nuclear material, the 
possibilities of cyberterrorism in connection 
to nuclear material are very limited. Never-
theless, it is not totally impossible, since 
similarly to the cyber-attack of the IT 
infrastructures of a biological lab, the target of 
such an attack can be a nuclear reactor as well, 
which if carried out successfully, has a very 
high chance of causing death, serious injury, 
or substantial damage to property.  
   Just like the Convention on Nuclear 
Material, the International Convention for the 
Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism 
also contains multiple physical acts (e.g. 





possessing radioactive material) that stay 
irrelevant in the context of cyberterrorism, but 
it also prohibits the damaging of a nuclear 
facility, which then leads to the (possibility of) 
dispersal of radioactive material. It must be 
noted that the cyberattack is to be qualified as 
a terrorist attack based on the intent alone, to 
compel a natural or legal person, an 
international organization, or a state to do or 
refrain from doing any act.  
   Shiryaev argues, that the case of Stuxnet, 
where the suspects Israel and the USA 
attacked the nuclear facilities of the Islamic 
Republic of Iran by means of a cyber-attack, 
is the first ever act of nuclear cyberterrorism, 
since the act hold the risk of dispersal of 
radioactive material, therefore it must have 
been seen as a breach of the rules of the 
Convention on Nuclear Terrorism, however 
neither Israel, nor the USA were part of the 
Convention on Nuclear Terrorism.  
 
 
   Cyberterrorism in regional agreements 
   Besides these international treaties, there are 
various regional agreements as well, that are 
essential for counter-terrorism in the Euro-
pean region (Kecskés, 2019). These are the 
following: 
 1977 European Convention on the 
Suppression of Terrorism. 
 2001 Convention on Cybercrime.  
 2003 Additional Protocol to the 
Convention on Cybercrime, Concerning 
the Criminalisation of Acts of a Racist 
and Xenophobic Nature Committed 
through Computer Systems.  
 Convention between the Kingdom of 
Belgium, the Federal Republic of 
Germany, the Kingdom of Spain, the 
French Republic, the Grand Duchy of 
Luxembourg, the Kingdom of the 
Netherlands and the Republic of Austria 
on the stepping up of cross-border 
cooperation, particularly in combating 
terrorism, cross-border crime and illegal 
migration.  
 2005 Council of Europe Convention on 
the Prevention of Terrorism. 
 2005 Council of Europe Convention on 
Laundering, Search, Seizure and 
Confiscation of the Proceeds from 
Crime and on the Financing of 
Terrorism 
 
   In terms of regulating cyberterrorism, from 
the list above the Council of Europe’s 
Convention on Cybercrime from 2001, also 
known as the Budapest Convention, is the 
most relevant source of law. 48 countries have 
joined the Budapest Convention, mostly 
European countries with a few exceptions, 
such as Russia, Turkey, and Switzerland. The 
Budapest Convention aims at the har-
monization of domestic criminal law on 
cybercrime committed via Internet or with 
other computer networks. Unfortunately, the 
Budapest Convention fails to regulate cyber-
terrorism, therefore it can only be seen as 
useful for cases of soft cyberterrorism, not 
however for so called hard cyberterrorism. 
   A long-awaited, new era of regulating ter-
rorism could come once the Comprehensive 
Convention on International Terrorism is 
agreed upon (De Vido, 2017). The United 
Nation’s Ad Hoc Committee was established 





as back as 1996, but the last meeting of the 
Committee to work on the draft of the 
convention took place in 2013. Unfortunately, 
the negotiations are currently still deadlocked, 
the reason being, no consensus could be 
found regarding the definition of terrorism.   
   The current system of treaties on con-
ventional terrorism is quite confusing and 
perplexing, which leads to a general 
uncertainty. The general approach of inter-
national law concerning the matter is to 
regulate as much as possible on a national 
level, which considering the international 
nature of cyberspace, is very counter-
productive. 
   In the authors view, the following problems 
can be identified in connection with the 
international regulation of cyberterrorism: 
 The identification of the attacker(s) can 
be very challenging, which can be the 
determination of jurisdiction as well as the 
enforcement of the law especially 
difficult. 
 The cases are very limited, where a cyber-
terrorist attack reaches the level of 
offences of conventional terrorism. 
Death, serious body injury, serious 
damage to property, or property damage 
that causes major economic loss are not 
impossible, but rather hard to achieve by 
cyber means. 
 The insufficient regulatory framework on 
cyberterrorism could and possibly will 
lead to the application of cybercrime 
norms on cyberterrorist cases, if some-
what plausible. As Fidler points out, this 
is against the general state interest, 
according to which terrorism in general 
needs to be distinguished from other 
crimes, not just in ’reality’, but in cyber-
space as well.  
   In summary, in light of the above, the 
author agrees with Fidler, who stated that 
international law on terrorism in its current 
form is not well applicable to cyberterrorism 
(Fidler, 2016). For certain cases, some of the 
treaties can be applied using a broad 
interpretation, however, a lot if cyberterrorist 
activity is left out, and stays unregulated.  
 
   Cyberterrorism  
   and International Humanitarian Law 
   The connection between cyberterrorism 
and international humanitarian law is out of 
the scope of this paper, however, it is 
important to mention that following the 
events in Estonia in 2007 and the cyber-
conflict between Russia and Georgia, as a 
response the North Atlantic Treaty Orga-
nization (NATO) established the NATO 
Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of 
Excellence in Estonia, and the Tallinn Manual 
on the International Law Applicable to Cyber 
Warfare was released in 2013. It was followed 
by the Tallinn Manual 2.0 on the International 
Law Applicable to Cyber Operations in 2017 
(Additionally, the Tallinn Manual 3.0 is 
currently being worked on.). Both of the 
Manuals lay down the basic principles for the 
application of law of war in cyberspace, and 
analyze the possibilities, how the current 
framework of international law could be 
applied on cyberattacks, or on a potential 
cyberwar. None of the Manuals have binding 
effect, and they have been criticized for being 
too vague, nevertheless, they are the first legal 
cornerstones for a potential future cyber war.  





   The fight against cyberterrorism  
   in the EU 
   The European Union Terrorism Situation 
and Trend Report from 2020 (TE-SAT) 
(Europol, European Union Terrorism Situ-
ation and Trend Report (TE-SAT) 2020, 
2020) is the Europol’s annual overview on the 
terrorist activities. In its latest version from 
2020, in addition to the Global Terrorism 
Index 2020 (IEP, 2020), the following recent 
data can be obtained on terrorism:  
   In 2019 there were a total of 119 completed, 
failed and foiled terrorist attacks and 1004 
arrests across Europe, the United Kingdom 
having the most terrorist cases (64 attacks, 281 
arrests). Interestingly, Spain had the second 
highest number of arrests (224), but only 7 
attacks, whereas Germany was attacked just 
three times and 35 individuals were arrested. 
Most cases can be linked to ethno-nationalist 
and separatists (57), left-wing groups (26), and 
jihadists (21), however, all ten people who 
died and 26 out of 27 who were injured, were 
victims of jihadist attacks.  
   In accordance with this data, the United 
Kingdom is the first among the European 
countries with the rank 30 on the chart of the 
latest Global Terrorism Index, which yearly 
measures the impact of terrorism in 135 
countries. Next is France (rank 38), then 
Greece (rank 44), and the third is Germany 
(rank 48). In terms of the level of impact of 
terrorism the United Kingdom, France and 
Greece are on level medium, and Germany is 
only on level low.  
   From the Internet Organised Crime Threat 
Assessment 2020 (IOCTA 2020) (Europol, 
2020), also provided by the Europol on a 
yearly basis, additional data can be obtained 
regarding cybercrime activities in the year 
2019. According to the IOCTA 2020, 
ransomware remained the most dominant 
threat both in the public as well as in the 
private sector. The second biggest threat 
proved to be malware attacks in the broader 
sense, such as banking Trojans and at third 
place were DDoS attacks, which are known as 
a major security threats in the critical 
infrastructure sector (Mezei, 2018).        
   As Kasznár pointed out, there are new 
tendencies to be seen regarding the terrorist 
activities in Europe (Kasznár, 2018). Kasznár 
mentions the significant changes in the acts 
and general functioning of terrorist groups in 
recent years, also the rising tendencies of new 
organizations parallel to the constantly 
growing activity of the old, major terrorist 
groups. Heffelfinger also points to the 
cybersecurity risks connected to the modern 
day jihad (Marsili, 2019).  
   In the authors opinion, in terms of 
cybersecurity risks connected to terrorist 
threats, there are two points to be made here. 
First of all, as mentioned above, terrorist 
groups do not show a great interest in 
attacking the cyber infrastructure of critical 
infrastructures yet. However, major inter-
national terrorist groups do have the financial 
means to take part in armed conflicts, to work 
together with transnational criminal 
organizations (Ivanov, 2014) and therefore 
unquestionably to hire professional hackers, 
qualified enough for such a high-level attack, 
moreover they are motivated more than ever 
to recruit new members from Europe (Répási, 
Az Európai Unión belüli terrorizmus 
tendenciái és jellegzetességei a TE SAT 2018 
kiadvány tükrében, 2018). Additionally, since 





the 2000s, there is a growing tendency of lone 
wolf terrorism in North-, Western-, and 
South-Europe (Répási, 2014) therefore 
prevention and detection play an important 
role in an effective national cybersecurity 
system (Papp, 2018). It can be presumed that 
it is only a question of time, when the attacks 
will come, not whether they come at all.  
   Another possibility for major terrorist 
groups is to qualify their own members, which 
solves the issue with purely financially moti-
vated hackers not wanting to work for a 
terrorist group, even though it is un-
questionably time-consuming since it takes 
multiple years of training.  
   The second consideration to be made is that 
with the recently rising number of new 
terrorist organizations, there is a high chance 
of the rise of cyberterrorist groups, that are 
purely active in cyberspace. This could bring a 
whole new era of counterterrorism challenges 
both in Europe and in the rest of thew world. 
Newly established, smaller organizations will 
hardly have the same human and financial 
recourses as big terrorist groups though, 
therefore their activities will presumably be 
limited to Internet based cybercrimes and 
cyberattacks against uncomplicated, not 
highly secured information systems, at least in 
the beginning years.  
   The basis for the regulatory framework on 
terrorism in the EU gives Title VII. Article 
222 as well as Title V Chapter 1 Article 67 and 
75 and Chapter 4 Article 83 of the Treaty on 
the Functioning of the European Union 
(TEFU) (Pék, 2020). According to the 
solidarity clause of Article 222.: 
   The Union and its Member States shall act jointly 
in a spirit of solidarity if a Member State is the object 
of a terrorist attack or the victim of a natural or man-
made disaster. The Union shall mobilise all the 
instruments at its disposal, including the military 
resources made available by the Member States, to:  
   (a) - prevent the terrorist threat in the territory of the 
Member States; - protect democratic institutions and 
the civilian population from any terrorist attack; - 
assist a Member State in its territory, at the request of 
its political authorities, in the event of a terrorist 
attack;  
   (b) assist a Member State in its territory, at the 
request of its political authorities, in the event of a 
natural or man-made disaster.  
 
   As Pék pointed out, neither the TEFU, nor 
other regulations that were based on these 
articles use common terms regarding ter-
rorism, moreover, the various definitions 
(such as terrorist attack, terrorist threat) used 
by them are not defined either. Unfortunately, 
the regulatory practice of the EU follows the 
international trend, which consequently leads 
to a much lower level of efficiency. 
   The Council Framework Decision 
2002/475/JHA of 13 June 2002 on combat-
ing terrorism was the first legal act by the EU 
that regulated the fight against terrorism in the 
Union. 15 years later in 2017 came the 
Directive 2017/541 of the European 
Parliament and of the Council on combating 
terrorism, which then replaced the said 
Council Framework Decision. The Terrorism 
Directive defines the terms funds, legal person 
and terrorist groups in its Article 2. According 
to Title II. Article 3. Paragraph 1. and 2. of the 
Terrorism Directive Member States must take 
the necessary measures to ensure that various 
intentional acts, as defined as offences under 
national law, which, given their nature or 





context, may seriously damage a country or an 
international organization, are defined as 
terrorist offences in case they are committed 
with the aim to  
 seriously intimidate a population;  
 unduly compel a government or an inter-
national organization to perform or 
abstain from performing any act;  
 seriously destabilize or destroy the 
fundamental political, constitutional, eco-
nomic or social structures of a country or 
an international organization. 
 
   The list of terrorist offences is exhaustive 
and includes amongst others the fol-lowing 
cases that have the most relevance to 
cyberterrorist activities in the authors opinion:  
 extensive destruction of an information 
system likely to endanger human life or 
result in major economic loss 
 seizure of aircraft, ships or other means of 
public or goods transport 
 release of dangerous substances, or 
causing fires, floods or explosions, the 
effect of which is to endanger human life 
 illegal system interference,  and illegal data 
interference  
 the threat to commit any of these acts.     
 
   The Directive includes cases when the at-
tack is purely directed against an infor-mation 
system with the intent of disruption or 
destruction, however, in light of the con-
siderations made above regarding the multi-
lateral treaties on international terrorism, 
other cases of terrorism can be committed by 
means of a cyber-attack as well. Evidently, the 
possibility of the seizure of an aircraft through 
a cyber-attack is currently enormously low, 
however, it is important that the regulatory 
framework is flexible enough, that in case 
such events occur, the attack can be qualified 
and reacted to accordingly as an act of terror.   
   The second important source of law is the 
Directive 2013/40/EU of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 12 August 
2013 on attacks against information systems, 
which by replacing the Council Framework 
Decision 2005/222/JHA on attacks against 
information systems advanced and strength-
ened the regulatory framework (Oleksiewicz, 
2017). The main aim of the Directive was to 
establish a common approach to criminal 
offences in respect of attacks against infor-
mation systems. According to Preambulum 10 
of Directive 2013/40/EU the „penalties should 
be effective, proportionate and dis-suasive and should 
include imprisonment and/or fine.” 
   The Directive provides for criminal 
penalties only for cases that are not minor, but 
the Member States have the competence to 
determine what constitutes a minor case 
according to their national law and practice. 
The Directive regulates the following cases of 
cybercrime: 
 illegal access to information systems 
 illegal information system interference 
 illegal data interference 
 illegal interception of computer data to, 
from or within an information system, 
including electromagnetic emissions 
 
   According to Article 9 of the Directive 
2013/40/EU all the offences from the list 
above must be punishable by a maximum 
term of imprisonment of at least two years, 
whereas in cases of aggravating factors, the 
punishment must be at least five years of 





imprisonment. Such an aggravating factor is, 
when the perpetrator(s) commit illegal system 
interference, or illegal data interference 
against a critical infrastructure information 
system.  
   In summary, the current European ten-
dencies regarding regulating terrorism do not 
differ from the broad framework of 
international law. For now, the clear focus on 
cybercrime does not seem to cause legal 
issues, since terrorist activities are still 
restricted to broadcasting propaganda and 
fundraising via Internet-based cybercrimes, 
however, once cybercrime becomes an active 
national security risk factor, the regulatory 
deficiencies will be clear and they will cause 
legal and law enforcement issues as well. In 
the author’s opinion, it would be absolutely 
necessary to for the EU to regulate 
cyberterrorism on a deeper level. Instead of 
only focusing on cybercrime, potentially 
committed both by cybercriminals as well as 
by cyberterrorists, the EU needs to recognize 
the fact that it is only a matter of time until the 
lack of a clear, detailed regulatory framework 
on cyberterror leads to a disastrous outcome. 
Potential areas of regulatory and security 
policy development could be the following: 
 creating the Convention on Cyber-
terrorism modeled on the Convention on 
Cybercrime, within the framework of 
which regulations regarding national 
cyberterrorism jurisdiction, as well as the 
different types of cyberterrorist activities 
and their minimum sentence could be 
established;  
 addressing terrorist activity on social 
media through restrictive regulatory 
measures, especially the propaganda 
directed at the younger generations of 
Muslim faith living in Europe with the 
goal of lowering the risk of their 
recruitment; 
 establishing an adequate, higher level of 
security for newer technologies (such as 
cloud services, and Internet of Things 
services) in cases, where they are used by 
actors of the public sector; 
 since terrorists mainly attack innocent 
people, this tendency will presumably not 
change in cyberspace either, therefore it 
would be also fundamental to raise 
general awareness of potential cyber-
threats linked to terrorist organizations on 
a European, as well as on a national level. 
 
 
   Cyberterrorism in Hungary 
   According to Simon, considering the 
organizational structure of the units fighting 
cybercrime, with the goal of an optimal 
allocation of data, the following categories can 
be created in Hungary (Simon, 2018): 
 cyber attacks 
 bankcard frauds 
 online sexual exploitation of children  
 cybercrimes against intellectual property  
 other types of frauds committed online. 
   However, Simon acknowledges the fact 
described by the author above, that no hard 
lines can be drawn between the various types 
of cybercrime, hence their interlacing 
character (Simon, 2018). Therefore, in case of 
cyberterrorist activity, no one specific law 
enforcement unit will be involved, but rather 
a handful, each investigating according to 
their specialty. As a consequence, besides 
questions in relation to dogmatics, in the 





author’s opinion differentiating between the 
different types of cybercrimes does only play 
a significant role once legal actions are 
pursued against an attacker, not however in 
the stages of defense, deflection, counter-
measures, or cyber-investigations. 
   In Hungary, the main regulatory framework 
of cybercrime and cyberterrorism consists of 
multiple sections of the Act C of 2012 on the 
Criminal Code (hereafter referred to as: 
Criminal Code), as well as the Act L on 
Information Security of State and Local 
Government Bodies (hereafter referred to as: 
Information Security Act) and the Degree 
233/2013 (VI. 30.). Additionally, the Act 
CLXVI. of 2012 on Critical Infrastructures 
and the Degree 65/2013. (III. 8.) need to be 
mentioned as the primary legislation on 
critical (information) infrastructure pro-
tection. In the following the author discusses 
the two main Sections of the Criminal Code, 
that have the most relevance considering the 
topic of this paper:   
 
 
   Section 314 of the Criminal Code: Acts of terrorism 
   For a long time, there was no specific 
Paragraph in Section 314 of the Criminal 
Code for terrorist acts committed in the 
cyberspace. This changed with the Act XLIII 
of 2020 which entered into force on 1 January 
2021, which by adding litera i) to Section 314 
Paragraph 4 widened the scope of the 
regulation. Since the beginning of this year 
terrorist acts can be committed with the 
breach of an information system or data as per 
Section 423 of the Criminal Code, in case the 
criminal offence endangers the public or 
involves the use of arms in order to 
 coerce a government agency, another 
State or an international body into doing, 
not doing or countenancing something, 
 intimidate the general public, 
 conspire to change or disrupt the 
constitutional, economic or social order 
of another State, or to disrupt the 
operation of an international organization 
(Section 314 Par 1 of the Criminal Code). 
   In light of the above, for cyberterrorism the 
endangerment of the public is of relevance 
rather than the use of arms.  
 
 
   Section 423 of the Criminal Code: Breach of 
information system or data 
   Pursuant to Section 423 Paragraph 1 of the 
Criminal Code any person, who gains 
unauthorized entry to an information system, 
disrupts the use of the information system 
unlawfully or by way of breaching his user 
privileges, or alters, deletes, or renders 
inaccessible without permission or by way of 
breaching his user privileges data in the 
information system can be sentenced up to 
two years. Paragraph 3 specifies the ag-
gravating circumstance, when the criminal 
offense is committed against works of public 
concern. In light of Section 459 Point 21 of 
the Criminal Code, which defines works of 
public concern, unfortunately the term used 
by the Criminal Code is not equivalent to the 
definition of critical infrastructures, therefore 
in cases when for example the healthcare 
facilities are targeted (Mezei, 2018). 
   Other important cybercrimes that could be 
of relevance in the context of cyberterrorism 
are the following: 





 Section 375 of the Criminal Code: 
Information system fraud 
 Section 422 of the Criminal Code: Illicit 
access to data 
 Section 424 of the Criminal Code: 
Compromising or Defrauding the 
Integrity of the Computer Protection 
System or Device 
 
   As mentioned above, the laws regulating the 
defence of information systems of critical 
infrastructures, that are possible targets of 
cyberterrorists, are on one side the In-
formation Security Act and the Degree 
233/2013 (VI. 30.) in connection to it, as well 
as the Act CLXVI of 2012 on Critical 
Infrastructures and the Degree 65/2013 (III. 
8.). According to the Information Security 
Act, all critical infrastructures regulated in the 
Act CLXVI of 2012  are also subject of this 
Act. Unfortunately, the Information Security 
Act does not regulate any cyber-defence 
measures for the information system of 
critical infrastructures, it only promotes the 
coordination and cooperation between the 




   Conclusions 
   Cyberterrorism is still a very new aspect of 
international and national security threat 
landscape and it takes time until the regulatory 
frameworks will be adapted to the new 
challenges. In the current state of international 
law on terrorism, the international co-
operation in case of a cyberterrorist attack 
would be difficult and time-consuming. In 
light of the current regulatory framework, 
each state has to secure its own cyberspace, 
regardless the fact that cyberspace and the 
risks and threats connected to it are of 
international nature, therefore, an effective 
defense system is unimaginable without 
cooperation and clear jurisdictions. The long-
awaited Comprehensive Convention on 
International Terrorism could be a major step 
towards a secure cyberspace, however as 
indicated above, it may take years, until an 
agreement is made on questions like the 
definition of terrorism. The author presents 
multiple key areas of potential development 
that could lead to a much safer cyberspace in 
the European region. The most fundamental 
would be a Convention on Cyberterrorism, 
which could be a modern version of the 
Budapest Convention of 2001, however, 
focusing on cyberterrorism. Establishing clear 
guidelines on jurisdiction, and sentencing 
could be major (cyber-)security policy steps 
for Europe. But the author argues also, that 
since terrorist attacks target the innocent, and 
through the Internet and general digitalization 
of the world, it is easier than ever to attack the 
general public on a large scale, it is 
fundamental that besides the military-focused 
international measures of the NATO, the EU 
focuses on the civil aspects of cyberterror (e.g. 
social media; raising awareness to the 
importance of cybersecurity from the aspects 
of terror) as well.   
   Regarding the laws of Hungary on cyber-
terrorism, it needs to be pointed out, that even 
though the regulatory framework is not 
flawless, and more work is needed, especially 
in the sector of critical information infra-
structure protection, it is in accordance with 
the current European standards. Further-





more, the widening of the scope of Section 
314 of the Criminal Code can be regarded as 
forward-looking, and promising. With the 
help of this change, law enforcement is able to 
categorize and react to a potential cyber-
terrorist attacks as such, as a consequence of 
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